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This paper discusses the nature of higher expertise in society and the role of higher education 
in constituting that expertise. It is argued that higher expertise relies on disciplined norms 
against which expert activity can be evaluated, and such norms are the basis not only for 
knowledge communities in higher education but also for other societal institutions. However, 
expertise in these communities and institutions is challenged by both external and internal 
factors, which can be explored via Durkheim’s discussion of the social organisation of 
religion and magic. It is suggested that ‘Post-truth’ developments are fuelled by the 
marketisation and commodification of expertise, and by a collapse in deference and trust 
throughout society to which expert institutions and communities have not yet adequately 
responded. Bernstein’s pedagogic rights of enhancement, inclusion and participation are 
examined to offer insight into how higher expertise may be enabled in such a context.  
 



















This paper discusses the nature of higher expertise in society and the role of higher education 
in constituting and advancing that expertise. It is argued that the development and sustenance 
of higher expertise is reliant on certain conditions of disciplinary community, and on norms 
of social practice agreed by experts who have a stake in the ongoing development of that 
expertise. These are necessary elements not only for higher education but also as the basis for 
all forms of civic practice in contemporary society, including in professional bodies, the 
media and government.  
Drawing on the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of expertise it is argued that the 
realisation of expertise is challenged in higher education by  marketisation and the 
commodification of knowledge, with consequences for academic practice.Universities are 
under pressure to demonstrate their value and relevance in the context of mass data flows, 
public access to information sources and the intensity of the contemporary media cycle 
(Altbach 2015). New uncertainties have arisen with multiple potential sources of knowledge, 
leading to difficulties with weighing arguments and validating evidence, and with separating 
opinion from justified true belief.   ‘Post-truth’ developments are fuelling this a 
commodification and generating confusion about issues of interest and bias, and therefore 
obscuring the potential for a genuinely democratic participatory discourse. This is achieved 
by a ‘growing distrust in facts’ that are said to suit the agenda of ‘the establishment’ (Peters 
2017, 563), and ‘appeals to emotion’ (ibid., 564) that exploit the difficulties the contemporary 
media has in articulating substantive political debate.   Peters suggests the possibility to 
deliberately disregard truthfulness ‘erodes trust as the very foundation of relations amongst 
human beings’ and that ‘argumentation, deliberation, reflection and fact-checking’ are 
squeezed out of the relentless cycle of news and information that dominates the public 
sphere. These post-truth phenomena are closely allied with the assault on inner commitments 
to knowledge and expert practice that have characterised contemporary professional and 
academic life, (Beck and Young 2005), an assault that is primarily driven by commercial 
interests that see academic and professional forms of organisation as an obstacle to 
profitability (Bernstein 2000; Freidson 2001). If commercial opportunity overrides other 
considerations of quality and value, then deceit is a viable strategy if it leads to revenue.  
The potential of higher expertise, and its erosion in a post-truth society, can be helpfully 
explored  through the contrasting Durkheimian models of the secularised church and the 
magical society. These securalised church is used here to sketch out the modes of 
organisation that underpin expert society, through which expert practices can emerge which 
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are based upon consensually-agreed norms. Inclusion and participation are the mainstay of 
the model Durkheim outlines – the boundaries between experts and novices are permeable. 
Magical societies, on the other hand, are merely opportunities to share processes of 
exclusivity and deceit, but only amongst a closed circle. Participation is instrumental, and 
only where there is an opportunity for individual gain. Any sharing of expertise more widely 
to those experiencing the magical acts would defeat the purpose of the activity.  Any 
commitment to truth or community becomes a sign of weakness, and an opportunity that 
others can exploit for personal gain.  The final part of the paper explores the potential for 
Bernstein’s pedagogic rights of enhancement, inclusion and participation as an insight into 
how higher expertise may be enabled and constrained, and as a means for thinking through 
academic practice in higher education. These three rights are seen as interrelated and co-
dependent. The neglect of one or more of these rights in an educational community is likely 
to hinder the ongoing development of expertise in higher education. Higher expertise needs a 
framework to support it, and to be able to clearly express the processes by which it can be 
sustained. Bernstein’s pedagogic rights can offer this opportunity.  
What constitutes higher expertise? 
It is important to first consider the conditions through which expertise is generated. Winch 
(2010), in a philosophical deliberation on the nature and practice of expertise, draws attention 
to the importance of normativity, purposiveness, and the interrelation between forms of 
know-how and know-that. Expert activity, whether it takes place in academic or other 
occupational contexts, requires the availability and enactment of systematic propositional 
knowledge, inferential and procedural know-how and some acquaintance with subject matter 
(Winch 2010). Winch demonstrates why these forms of knowledge are necessary for expert 
activity by identifying expertise with the capacity to make appropriate judgements in novel 
situations, taking account of existing knowledge and practice. Experts are able to interpret 
and apply propositions as a consequence of being able to make inferences from their wider 
knowledge of related propositions, whilst also understanding how procedures are employed 
to make judgements about new claims to knowledge. 
Such a view of the use of knowledge in expert activity is pertinent to occupations for which 
expertise is intermittently or regularly required (of which arguably there are many, including 
many manual occupations) and occupations which are defined primarily or solely by their 
expertise (i.e. the professions including academics). Thus an expert historian or physicist 
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should be able not only to apply necessary procedures to evaluate a new claim to knowledge, 
but also to understand the significance of such a claim, once it has been admitted to the body 
of knowledge (Muller 2014). A doctor or an engineer, while they may not necessarily need to 
handle new claims to knowledge as part of their work, will require the capacity to understand 
how that knowledge impacts on their medical or engineering practice, and the decisions that 
they take about patients and projects.  
However, expert activity is only made possible by the existence of certain social conditions.  
Firstly, there must be some scope for the evaluation of activity against existing norms, a 
capacity for norm-referencing (Winch 2010). This recognises that expert activity does not 
exist in a time-space vacuum – there are others engaged in the pursuit of expertise in any 
occupation or academic discipline, and there is a history to that expert practice that has 
constituted ways of conducting the practice and evaluating claims to expertise that may be 
valuable for current practice. Secondly, any notion of expertise implies a desire to maintain 
and if possible improve a high standard of performance, and therefore ‘criteria for excellence’ 
(Macintyre 2001) are likely to be central to the norms by which expert practice is defined. 
Thirdly, expert practice relies on a notion of community through which the practice is 
pursued.. The idea that practice should be evaluated by peers is central to a norm-referenced 
practice that espouses expertise. Such norms cannot be generated without a community who 
can co-operatively establish and enact ‘mutual accountability’ (Rouse 2007, 48) for the 
practice, and this may well require some forms of ritual interaction to sustain the community 
(Collins 2000). It is the expert community which is able to establish agreed procedures for the 
evaluation of knowledge claims as expertise iterates, and to maintain the inferential capacity 
which makes propositional knowledge meaningful.  
Central to these notions of mutual accountability in the development of community norms is 
the notion of telos, or purpose. Without a purpose towards which expertise is directed there is 
no substance or problematic by which expert activity can be evaluated apart from the self-
referential operations and survival instincts of the community itself (Winch 2010; Hager 
2011; Young and Muller 2014). No community exists within a vacuum, and as society 
changes and technologies develop, the purposes of experts may need to be reimagined and re-
explained, including to novices as they enter the expert community. Rouse (2007) and Winch 
(2010) recognise this in suggesting that there are special forms of human activity (i.e. 
practices for Macintyre 1981) that are defined by their purposiveness and social contribution, 
to their members and to wider society. Hager (2011), in an engagement with MacIntyre’s 
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notion of a practice, emphasises the significance of socially beneficial external goods that are 
simultaneously expressions of the internal goods generated by the practice: he provides the 
example of the construction of a cathedral as evidence of the importance of a ‘balance of 
internal and external goods’ (2011, 553). A public building such as a cathedral offers an 
opportunity not only to fulfil a ‘social purpose, but also to offer an ‘outstanding example…of 
architectural vision’ that provides ‘an exemplar and inspiration’ (ibid., 552-553) for those 
interested in architecture and construction. Rouse (2007) distinguishes between practices that 
have something ‘at stake’ and those that are simply expressions of regularity or rule-
following. These ‘at stake’ practices clearly relate to the academic and professional 
disciplines of higher education, which are seeking to produce internal and external goods for 
social benefit. Whether Architecture or Chemistry (Hager 2011), such disciplines are 
purposefully pursuing problematics and deeper understandings of the world. This is never 
really ‘knowledge for its own sake’ – there is always a broader purpose towards which 
inquiry is directed.  
So what are the underlying conditions for this purposiveness that sustains a ‘criteria of 
excellence’ for the expert practice of an academic discipline or an expert occupation? Young 
and Muller (2007) draw attention to Williams’s () work on ‘truth’ and ‘truthfulness’, and the 
relations between these, for an understanding of the sociology of knowledge. For many, the 
purpose of academic work is to establish the truth, or at least an approximation of ontological 
reality (Young and Muller 2007).e. The enactment of ‘truthfulness’, understood as ‘an 
eagerness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie behind them’ 
(Williams 2002, 1)), is fundamental to academic expertise. This truthfulness involves the 
scrutiny and challenge of ‘received wisdom’ in the discipline and ongoing critique of new 
claims to knowledge. It thus informs methodologies and disciplinary procedures and 
dispositions across the academic disciplines, and provides an imperative – an ongoing spirit 
of inquiry. In the context of the practice of a professional occupation such as medicine or 
engineering, the commitment to truthfulness might be seen as a commitment to integrity and 
rigour as much as truth itself, and to the enactment of practice according to the criteria of 
excellence established by the professional community. However, as Williams (2002) 
indicates, the commitment to truthfulness can undermine commitments to truth, if it is 
manifested in a manner that construes the concept of truth itself as questionable. While 
knowledge may always be fallible and revisable, the assertion that truth claims are only 
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relative and open to ‘subjective interpretation’ opens up opportunities for the ‘subordination 
of truth’ (Peters 2017, 565) to other more powerful concerns.   
 
The notion of expertise also suggests that it is possible to conduct an activity in a non-expert 
manner, as central to the notion is the idea that activities and practices can be evaluated as to 
whether they meet normatively-agreed standards or not. This opens up the potential for 
differentiation between the different enactments of a practice on the basis of criteria of 
excellence, and also offers the opportunity for progress through a trajectory from novice to 
competent practitioner to expert (Winch 2010). It makes it possible to make evaluative 
grounded judgements about claims to knowledge and claims to competence, asserting that 
disciplinary and professional communities can soundly and reasonably discriminate between 
these. A suitably initiated expert can thus judge whether a claim to knowledge or expertise is 
indeed only an expression of individual opinion, or in fact a more reasonable claim based 
upon argument, reasoning and where necessary substantive evidence. Educational experts can 
expose dubious claims through the application of rigour, reasoning and disciplinary 
knowledge (e.g. Coffield et al. 2004 on learning styles), and architectural experts possessing 
‘the requisite knowledge and experience’ (Hager 2011, 553) are able not only to appreciate 
the aesthetic of building design but also the principles of construction that ensure the building 
does not collapse. Purposive expertise, mutually constituted within a community of experts, 
therefore offers the opportunity to differentiate between claims and to establish a mechanism 
through which claims can be judged in accordance with recognised criteria. As noted above, 
this also depends on a systematic knowledge base and the development of certain forms of 
know-how, all of which are (ideally) in a process of continual iteration as new claims are 
sorted and managed, and redundant claims discarded when no longer tenable. 
 
The role of higher expertise in society 
Higher education can be seen as a significant contributor of higher expertise in contemporary 
society. The production of knowledge through research and inquiry has enabled the 
development of bodies of disciplinary knowledge which enable authoritative judgements to 
be made about claims to knowledge, not only within higher education but also in wider social 
contexts.  Those Higher Education Institutions influenced by the Humboltdian emphasis on 
the ‘necessary expansion and reproduction of scientific knowledge and research’ (Nybom 
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2003, 144) may see inquiry as central to their mission, tending towards a view of knowledge 
as emergent and iterative, rather than as ‘received wisdom’ to be (just) handed down through 
the generations. Thus bodies of academic knowledge may develop in ways that respond to 
wider social, economic and technological change, while remaining rooted in particular 
traditions of inquiry. A degree of stability in procedures for evaluating knowledge claims 
over time enables knowledge to be accumulated that does not unnecessarily repeat earlier 
contributions. Moreover, academic practices that illustrate the centrality of excellence criteria 
should reassure those external to the discipline that claims to knowledge are evaluated fairly 
and with recourse to established and mutually agreed procedures. This enables disciplinary 
traditions to develop that can offer insight to those who study them or at least accept their 
claims as credible. Thus the physical and natural and social sciences, the humanities and 
applied or professionally-orientated disciplines such as medicine or engineering are able to 
demonstrate, through their procedures, that they can offer expertise that is rigorously 
scrutinised.  
Yet, as outlined above, if the purpose of the expert practice is so internally controlled by an 
expert community that it takes no account of the wider interests of society and changing 
social and technological conditions, then its claims of expertise are increasingly hollow. The 
notion of expertise requires that others value your knowledge for what it offers in terms of 
insight, or in terms of its capacity to help in the solving of problems. That expert knowledge 
may have a social or occupational role, and in many cases may feed into multiple social 
practices. Thus historical expertise is valued for its capacity to offer insight into the ongoing 
development of the world around us over time, while medical expertise brings scientific 
knowledge together to address the ‘supervening purpose’ (Muller 2009, 213) of sustaining 
and improving physical and mental health. Disciplines in higher education thus have varied 
purposes that shape the nature of the expertise they offer, who that expertise is valued by and 
the various ways in which it is used. Those involved in producing historical or medical 
knowledge are unlikely to have a full view of all the uses to which that knowledge could be 
put, and of who is it likely to be valued by, but they are likely to have a reasonable grasp of 
the principal aspects of the discipline and therefore the various dimensions of the disciplinary 
purpose.  
None of what is said here, however, suggests that all academic disciplines consistently 
maintain clear and mutually agreed purposes, or adhere to criteria of excellence and 
exemplary and equitable procedures for judging new claims to knowledge. The various 
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criticisms of bias in peer review, and instances of the variable or inconsistent scrutiny of new 
knowledge claims (Rennie 2016), suggests that disciplinary ‘health’ can vary. The purposes 
of disciplinary inquiry may become muddled and unclear if the disciplinary problematic or 
manner of inquiry is not mutually agreed. There is no guarantee that knowledge will 
accumulate or progress over time, and instead disciplinary activity may descend into a 
‘bureaucratisation of intellectual life’ full of ‘routinized activity’ and the ‘quantitative 
extension of classifications’ (Collins 2000, 799), which ultimately do little to clarify or 
provide insight. The profane dimensions of disciplinary activity may also tend to 
predominate, if market imperatives, government policies or career incentives ascend to such a 
degree that novel forms of research are either not recognised or not undertaken.   
It can be argued that the purpose of higher expertise in higher education is to produce and 
iterate ‘collective representations’ that symbolise and unify society (Durkheim 1912/2001). 
The iterative aspect is vital, as what counts as the ‘sacred’ in a given time or space may alter 
with social, economic and technological change. The notion of a ‘collective representation’ 
suggests recognition of the value of this symbolic knowledge across society, and thus an 
acknowledgement of the role of higher education as a social institution that helps to bind the 
collectivity and to shape its identity. Such a relationship could be characterised as deferential, 
especially if higher education is considered only or chiefly accessible, or relevant, to certain 
social groups. Indeed, historically it can be argued that the relationship between the 
population and higher education mirrored the previous relationship between the population 
and the church, as higher education replaced the church as the site of sacred thought from the 
enlightenment onwards (Bernstein 2000), but reorientated the notion of revealed truth 
towards ceaseless inquiry.  Furthermore, as mass higher education has evolved, the collective 
representations of the past that suited the elite have been increasingly challenged. New 
collective representations and new forms of higher expertise are required as wider swathes of 
society ‘access the site of the unthinkable’ (Wheelahan 2012). 
Durkheim (2001) offers a useful further distinction that can assist in the better understanding 
of the conditions for healthy development of expertise, the iteration of the collective 
representations over time and the social organisation of higher education. In the elementary 
forms of religious life, Durkheim identifies a defining feature of a society as consisting of 
members who ‘share a common conception of the sacred world and its relation to the profane 
world’ and who ‘translate this common conception into identical practices’ (2001, 42-43). 
This was the basis of an idealised Church, for Durkheim, which is not ‘simply a priestly 
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brotherhood’ but a ‘moral community formed by all believers…worshippers as well as 
priests’ (44). In a post-enlightenment world where the revealed truth is replaced by inquiry, 
uncertainty and the challenges to any hierarchy of expertise, the relationship between the 
priests and the worshippers is altered significantly. The priest experts no longer have access 
to the revealed truth by virtue of their status but must become stewards of the process of the 
development of expertise. They are required to support the congregation (the people) in 
becoming more expert and eventually becoming the priest experts themselves, should they so 
wish. The displacement of the traditional church as the fount of knowledge results in a 
democratisation of expertise and a flattening of hierarchies, but within an institutional 
structure in which there remains an underlying shared conception of the relationship between 
the ‘sacred’ (or expert knowledge) and the ‘profane’ (non-expert knowledge) (Hordern 2018).  
While higher education therefore assumes from religion a central role in establishing societal 
collective representations, it adopts the requirement for a shared conception of expert 
knowledge and a set of values (a moral community) that underpinned the earlier church, even 
though that knowledge and those values may be very different from those held in earlier 
times.  
But does this lead to a distinctive or even singular role for higher education in society in the 
sustenance of higher expertise? In our contemporary societies founded on governmental, 
legal, professional and civic institutions, it seems important to consider whether there is 
anything distinctive about the relationship of higher education to expertise in wider society. 
The development of professional societies and organisations has historically been closely 
intertwined with higher forms of education (Bernstein 2000; Beck and Young 2005), and thus 
similar normative concerns and challenges may be experienced across various institutional 
forms. Beck and Young suggest that academia and the professions are subject to similar 
contemporary challenges, including ‘requirements to meet externally imposed performance 
criteria’ and ‘demands to demonstrate the relevance of their work’, leading to a context in 
which ‘cherished identities and commitments have been undermined’ (2005, 184). States 
have increasingly advanced governance structures for both the professions and higher 
education that have eroded the essence of professional logic through marketization and 
accountability mechanisms (Freidson 2001), and this challenges the capacity of academic and 
professional communities to control their own norms and shape their own expertise. For 
example, we have seen increasing challenges to professional authority in the classical 
professions (i.e. Medicine; Law) that parallel a scepticism regarding the authority of 
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academics (Beck and Young 2005). While some of this exposure to scrutiny may highlight 
abuse and corrupt practices, the tools by which accountability is assured and performance 
measured have had an impact on professional discretion and autonomy, undermining the role 
of professional judgement (Beck and Young 2005).  
Bernstein’s (2000) work suggests that the link between higher education and the professions 
can be found in the relationship between Christianity and higher education, with the 
‘inwardness and commitment’ found in the notion of the ‘professional’ shaping the ‘terms of 
practical engagement in the outer world’ (Beck and Young 2005, 187). For Bernstein (2000), 
echoing Durkheim (2001), it was the relationship of religion to society that had provided a 
model for contemporary institutional forms in higher education and the professions. The 
twist, post-enlightenment, is in the collapse of deference to a hierarchy and to established 
religion, and in the requirement to develop a new pedagogical relationship between experts 
and novices. The uncertainty and fluidity in this new scenario has opened up new forms of 
logic, based on the market and bureaucratic forms, to make inroads into higher education and 
the professions, introducing new objectives which dispute the ‘inwardness and commitment’ 
and restructure academic and professional identities (Freidson 2001; Beck and Young 2005). 
However, it could be argued that parts of higher education and the professions have also been 
slow to respond to the new mass engagement with collective representations (Luckett and 
Naicker 2016) – with the consequence that they may appear to protect specific elite interests 
in their own self-interested projects (Larson 1979). There are pressures on higher education 
institutions brought to bear by dominant models of elite education, including the global 
research university and the liberal arts college (Marginson 2006). This results in educational 
activities becoming intertwined with symbols of privilege and exclusivity, and barriers for 
those who may find such symbols alien or oppressive.   
 
Constraints and challenges to higher expertise 
Higher education is thus not isolated in its expert responsibilities to society, as professional 
organisations co-constitute this higher expertise. Higher education can be seen as central to 
the shaping of professional logic and organisation, and to the constitution of professional 
expertise, and therefore attacks on the expert role of higher education have ramifications for 
the wider fabric or professional and civic life. As noted above, academic and professional 
work are subject to considerable external pressures in the context of contemporary society. 
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The collapse of deference has not been seamlessly replaced in higher education by a more 
participative secular church in which inquiry is embraced (Durkheim 2001). External 
pressures have nevertheless been paralleled by concomitant internal challenges within the 
academic and professional communities themselves.  
Durkheim’s (2001) characterisation of the role of an idealised church in society, and 
suggestion that this is the basis for how we should consider the development of collective 
representations in contemporary society, is contrasted with the social organisation of magic. 
Durkheim identifies a key characteristic of magic as taking a kind of ’professional pleasure’ 
in ‘profaning holy things’ through ‘rites which are the mirror image of religious ceremonies’ 
(2001, 42), collapsing differentiation between the sacred and the profane. While an 
(idealised) secular church is characterised by a participative collectivity (the congregation), 
magic relies not on shared conceptions and understandings but on deception and an absence 
of understanding. The relationship between the magician and his ‘clientele’ is ‘accidental and 
transitory’ (ibid., 43) and is characterised not by a respect for truth but by persuasion and 
control. As Durkheim notes, ‘magic societies never include the believers in magic but only 
the magicians’ (ibid., 44), and thus their expertise is only thus because of their exclusivity. 
The magician seeks to gain and exercise power to secure his objectives – the manipulation of 
his audience. Instead of fostering the accuracy and sincerity which Williams (2002) suggests 
is necessary for truth and truthfulness, the magician thrives on opportunities for deceit and 
disorientation.  
Durkheim’s contrast between the idealised church and the organisation of magic raises a 
number of points that are relevant to higher expertise. The translation of the church model 
into the secularised version post the enlightenment (in the shape of a Humboltdian 
community of inquiry) is a model for the growth of expertise in society. For expertise to 
persist in a community which is conscious of the iterative character of knowledge, there is a 
need to absorb new initiates as the process of inquiry is continual. Equally, the iterative 
character of knowledge and the spirit of inquiry requires a form of partnership with the world 
beyond the institution.  Withdrawal into the monastic sphere is not sufficient in the post-
enlightenment university, as few truths can be found there. Thus there is an impetus to remain 
open to society, to sustain and transmit the model of expertise. This is the opposite of the 
context of magic, where withdrawal and secrecy is necessary; the magician is a ‘recluse’ 
(Durkheim 2001, 44) and partnership is only with fellow magicians, and even so such 
relations may be only transitory. Furthermore, trust, community and norm-based ‘mutual 
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accountability’ (Rouse 2001) are characteristics of a community of inquiry (Winch 2010; 
Beck and Young 2005), but the antithesis of magic. In the community of inquiry, the mutual 
accountability builds common bonds and a durability that can act as a repository of collective 
memory and wisdom, and through which ‘truthfulness’ can be enacted without forgetting the 
previous knowledge work of the community - the claims discussed, agreed and discarded.  
This mutual accountability accrues power for the community through shared conceptions of 
the world that can be refined and agreed, and yet adapted in the light of new findings and 
considerations. However, that power and immutability in the face of external pressures can be 
seen to be at the heart of contemporary tension in higher education, and indeed the challenge 
to notions of higher expertise outlined earlier. In a context in which market logics and 
commodification are reshaping the processes of higher education, the resilience of the 
organisational model of communities of inquiry and the higher expertise they represent is a 
potential stumbling block. For many governments and university managers the ideal 
academic is a competitive figure who constantly seeks advancement and recognition, as these 
are the particular assets which are of value to university reputation and ranking. Rather than 
advancement and recognition coming about as a due consequence of a commitment to inquiry 
and the advancement of collective expertise, these phenomena are valued in themselves, 
however they are achieved (Beck and Young 2005). The strategic academic is thus rewarded 
for canniness, for making strategic moves to advance career, funding and citation, as these 
are the only indicators that can be measured. Measures of commitment and collective 
expertise are difficult to identify, and anyway are not suitably individualised to fit with 
contemporary organisational reward and promotion structures. The appeal to forms of 
‘magic’ is clear – the strategic academic or university may ape the rituals of the community 
of inquiry but may have ulterior objectives – the maximisation of esteem and profit rather 
than the maximisation of expertise. Secrecy and surprise may be rewarded if it secures 
advantage – and regard to previous expertise is irrelevant – if an old trick can be presented as 
new with a fresh turn of phrase, or new terminology, then it should be performed if it has a 
good chance of achieving the desired results. Audiences must be drawn in to applaud, 
irrespective of the underlying value of the work.  
Tendencies towards these magical phenomena are arguably encouraged by the corporatisation 
of the university and the increasing supremacy of non-disciplinary purposes in the business of 
higher education. In a context in which institutional prestige and profitability has become a 
potent driver of behaviour, it is important to consider how these pressures can be mitigated. 
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The antithesis of the destructive power of magic can be found in those disciplinary 
communities that still seek to uphold shared conceptions of the sacred and to sustain common 
bonds, and here magical strategies may be resisted stubbornly. However, in some disciplines 
the structure of the knowledge base may allow for some fragmentation – and this may enable 
perspectives to grow that promise novelty and insight but offer little other than a new 
‘specialised language’ (Bernstein 1999) around which a new group of scholars can gather. 
Disciplines such as Sociology are notorious for their ability to endlessly produce new 
‘schools’ or ‘isms’ that are heralded by their advocates as offering some form of progress on 
previous thought. Critiques of ‘voice discourse’ and standpoint theory (i.e. Moore and Muller 
1999) suggest that some social theorists are hell-bent on unpicking any consensus around any 
agreed, albeit fallible, knowledge about the world. The endless quest to expose power 
relations could lead to the dismissal of any forms of reliable, credible knowledge, and a 
despairing relativism, if there is no impetus to arrive at new collective representations.  
Nevertheless, an emphasis on standpoint and unresolved power imbalances can also be 
understood as an over-riding concern for justice (Connell 2012), and as a reminder to the 
guardians of expertise that current collective representations may need further work to better 
accord with our ever-changing societies.  
 
Pedagogic rights as a framework for supporting higher expertise  
If the conditions for higher expertise are being destabilised by the commodification of 
knowledge and the reassertion of new forms of hierarchy, what models can higher education 
look to as democratic alternatives that preserve a notion of truth and expertise, but open the 
opportunity for their continual reconstruction? Bernstein’s three pedagogic rights 
(enhancement, inclusion and participation) were foregrounded in the introduction of his final 
book (2000, xx-xxi), at the start of a section entitled ‘Democracy and pedagogic rights’. They 
set out the ‘conditions for effective democracy’ (in discourse and practice) at the ‘individual’, 
‘social’ and ‘political’ level (ibid., xxi). They have not received much attention in the 
academic literature and remain to an extent ‘enigmatic’ (Frandji and Vitale 2016), although 
have recently been employed to discuss the South African higher education context (Luckett 
and Naicker 2016) and the role of universities in human development (McClean et al. 2017). 
What they offer is a means for considering the foundations for how expertise can operate in a 
society in which ‘all have a stake’ (Bernstein 2000, xx) in that expertise through ‘gift and 
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reciprocity’ (Frandji and Vitale 2016, 31), ‘giving’ and ‘receiving’ (Bernstein 2000, xx) for 
mutual benefit. What becomes clear through a closer analysis of the pedagogic rights, is that 
they are predicated upon and are interrelated with a notion of higher expertise, and that they 
provide the beginnings of an answer to the problematic question of engagement with the 
secular sacred in contemporary society that is discussed above.  
Firstly, there is the right to ‘individual enhancement’, which is described as a ‘a condition for 
experiencing boundaries’ and boundaries which are ‘tension points condensing the past and 
opening up possible futures’ (Bernstein 2000, xx). This right relies on the notion that 
enhancement is possible, and therefore that an individual can achieve a greater form of 
enlightenment or ‘critical understanding’(ibid.) through engagement with those ‘tension 
points’. This in turn assumes that someone somewhere (i.e. an expert community) must 
establish what those tensions points are and must judge when enhancement has taken place. 
We have therefore something akin to an aspect of ‘bildung’, formation or ‘subjectification’ 
(Biesta 2010), and based upon the notion of a trajectory towards greater expertise and 
understanding (Winch 2010). However, this is clearly not static but rests on the potential for 
‘new possibilities’ (Bernstein 2000, xx), thereby implying that the acquisition of current 
expertise is not an end in itself but a means for finding new engagement with the world. The 
expertise can thus be conceptualised as iterative and transformative, and the individual in 
accessing that expertise opens up new possibilities both for herself and for the future of that 
expertise. As Luckett and Naicker point out, this is the right ‘that realises both the private and 
public goods of HE’ (2016, 12), but is heavily compromised without the other two rights 
(participation and inclusion). If higher education is based only on individual enhancement to 
the exclusion of the right to participate and to be included, then the risk is not only that the 
most powerful individuals will dominate access to expertise, but also that expertise itself 
becomes increasingly moribund.  
Secondly, the relation between society and expertise is reinforced through the right to 
‘participation’, which is ‘not only about discourse, about discussion, it is about practice, and a 
practice that must have outcomes’ (Bernstein 2000, xx-xxi). Here Bernstein’s model 
envisages not only engagement with but also involvement in expert practice, suggesting that a 
democratic society is founded on a right not only to access expertise but also to become an 
expert oneself. Participation in the expert practice at the level of ‘outcome’, where that 
practice has something ‘at stake’ (Rouse 2001) is a right for all in society. Where this is 
unavailable democracy starts to break down and we have the grounds for increasing 
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alienation from that expertise. The right to participate means participation in the ‘procedures 
whereby order is constructed, maintained and changed’ (Bernstein 2000, xxi), and therefore 
this participation entails an increasing licence to take on responsibility for construction and 
change as the requirements of the expert body of knowledge change in the light of social, 
technological, physical and economic changes in the wider world. This is the condition for 
‘civic practice, and operates at the level of politics’ (ibid., xxi). Its modality affects the extent 
to which an expert body of knowledge maintains or loses relevance and truthfulness to the 
world around it, and to citizens in societies.  It suggests the norms of practice we should find 
in Durkheim’s idealised church, reimagined into a context of mass involvement in collective 
representation. 
Thirdly, the right to inclusion encompasses ‘the right to be included, socially, intellectually, 
culturally and personally’, but also ‘a right to be separate, to be autonomous’ (Bernstein 
2000, xx), and therefore to have one’s individuality and right to take a minority view 
respected. Lukett and Naicker (2016) outline how issues of ‘recognition’ are central to this, 
drawing on post-colonial contexts, but with salience to debates around engagement with 
higher education in European nations (i.e. see discussions of working class identity in higher 
education (Reay, Crozier and Clayton 2009; Bathmaker, Ingram and Waller 2013). 
Institutional life in higher education may be prone to conservatism, bias and hostility to 
difference, as in any institutional context. As Luckett and Naicker (2016) highlight, 
Bernstein’s pedagogic rights are part of a project of ‘analysis of the social biases in 
education’ which ‘lie deep within the very structure of the educational system’s 
processes…and their social assumptions (Bernstein 2000, xix). However, the ‘integration’ of 
inclusion must occur, importantly, ‘without absorption’ (Frandji and Vitale 2016, 16), leaving 
open the potential for agency and the ongoing iteration of expertise through engagement with 
new perspectives. Without this subtle conception of inclusion, which acknowledges the 
dialectic nature of social membership (Luckett and Naicker 2016), higher expertise risks 
either retreating to a notion of ‘received truth’ which all must accept with deference, or to the 
contradictions of truthfulness without the pursuit of truth (Young and Muller 2007). The 
emphasis on inclusion is therefore vital as a bulwark against attempts to retreat into elitism 




The above discussion raises questions for how higher education conceives its role, and for the 
practice of higher education.  It could be argued that norms that underpin expert practice in 
higher education constantly have to be challenged and reformed to take account of new 
realisations and accountabilities. However, in many societies governments have responded by 
pressurising higher education to respond to market imperatives and narrow measurements of 
expertise. Is there a tendency in such a context to retreat defensively to received truth or 
hierarchy, or to embrace corporate security, rather than support continual inquiry and accept a 
degree of uncertainty? Higher education institutions in some countries are increasingly 
distant from the communities in which they are based, answering instead to league tables and 
modelling their activities on notions of the ‘global research university’ (Marginson 2006). 
Furthermore, academic work seems increasingly to be defined in terms of measurable 
‘outcomes’, irrespective of community commitment. Are these promising conditions for the 
upholding of an open and iterative model of higher expertise which can effectively challenge 
‘post-truths’? It is not enough, therefore, to have an adequate conception of higher expertise, 
in a global context in which higher education institutions and academic practitioners are 
increasingly being pushed towards marketised research and pedagogic practices that respect 
only financial value. Such logics actively undermine the potential for expert communities to 
operate, and dismiss the criteria of excellence upon which notions of higher expertise  are 
based, replacing them with a belief in the ‘inevitable obsolescence’ (Beck and Young 2005, 
191) of knowledge forms that have become the commodified properties of winner-takes-all 
academics and institutions. Such academic practice becomes increasingly complicit with the 
‘post-truth’ marketplace, making the struggle for   higher expertise that bit more challenging.   
It is clear, furthermore, that the ‘post-truth’ context is antithetical to notions of higher 
expertise underpinned by and predicated on pedagogic rights. One thesis might be that the 
post truth context is a consequence of a collapse of deference for ‘authority’, both in 
institutional and epistemic terms, obscuring all that is good and true. An alternative argument 
might be that ongoing assaults on deference are necessary to expose dominance and bias, and 
that a ‘post-truth’ or ‘post-enlightenment’ context opens the opportunity for multiple voices 
to be heard and for undue influence to be exposed. A third view might emphasise that the 
post-truth context demonstrates the extent to which the knowledge embedded within expert 
communities has been ‘divorced from persons, their commitments, their personal dedications’ 
(Bernstein 2000, 86), as a consequence of the extension of market logics into higher 
expertise. The implication is that the notion of truth is increasingly commodified so that 
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knowledge can ‘flow like money to wherever it can create advantage and profit’ (ibid.). Truth 
becomes ‘truths’, belief becomes identity-based, and the few are able to reap the rewards of 
increasing levels of public and private disorientation.  
This paper has sought to demonstrate how the constituent elements of expertise are strongly 
interdependent with the nature of society, and the ‘sociality’ (Young and Muller 2007) 
thereby underpinning that expertise.  It is suggested that the institutions and disciplinary and 
professional communities responsible for higher expertise have insufficiently recognised the 
new context of a non-deferential society in which all assertions are challenged, and need to 
work harder at ensuring inclusion and participation to make enhancement a possibility for all. 
Making pedagogic rights central to a refreshed notion of higher expertise thus requires a 
commitment to all three rights: enhancement, inclusion and participation. Commitment to one 
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